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Relative Normativity: Challenging the
Sovereignty Norm Through Human
Rights Litigation
BY WILLIAM J. ACEVES*
Introduction
Sovereignty has long been considered the grundnorm of
international law.' The sovereignty norm affirms the territorial
integrity of the state and the rule of non-intervention. While many
scholars have traced its development to the Peace of Westphalia, the
sovereignty norm did not enter the lexicon of international law until
the 18th Century, with the writings of Emerich de Vattel Since then,
the stature of the sovereignty norm has increased. In 1945, its
primacy in international law was affirmed through codification in
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter: "All Members shall
* William J. Aceves is Professor of Law at California Western School of Law.
This Essay is based on remarks prepared by the author for the Symposium on
International Law and the Changing Face of Sovereignty convened at the University
of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD 6 (1990). See generally HURST HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1996); STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas
J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE MARIE
BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND
APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995).
2. Four versions of sovereignty have been identified: international legal
sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence
sovereignty. Stephen Krasner defines Westphalian sovereignty as a form of political
organization "based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures
within a given territory." See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3-4 (1999).
3. EMERICH DE VATIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1844). See generally DANIEL
PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED MODERN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2001).
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refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state. . . ."' The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), which is the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has acknowledged the
importance of the sovereignty norm on numerous occasions.
While the sovereignty norm remains at the core of international
law, it sits on a precarious perch . Since 1945, two developments in
human rights law have challenged its dominion. First, the
international community has recognized the existence of other norms
that now compete with the sovereignty norm for primacy These
norms include, inter alia, the right to be free from torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to life and the
prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life, and the prohibition
against genocide.8 Each of these norms has attained jus cogens status
as non-derogable obligations that bind all states. Second, diverse
institutions - including national courts and international tribunals -
have applied these human rights norms to challenge the sovereignty
norm.9 They have done so by imposing civil and criminal liability on
government officials who commit serious human rights abuses.'" In
short, the impact of human rights law on sovereignty has been to
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
5. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
6. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the sovereignty norm has been
challenged since its creation. See PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES
AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001).
7. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation
Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996); LAURI HANNIKAINEN,
PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988).
8. See generally John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International
Law: From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433 (1997);
Elizabeth E. Ruddick, Note, The Continuing Constraint on Sovereignty: International
Law, International Protection, and the Internally Displaced, 77 B.U. L. REV. 429
(1997).
9. See William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The
Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law
Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (2000).
10. In these cases, jurisdiction is generally established through the principle of
universal jurisdiction. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for
International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 81 (2001); Symposium, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and
Prospects, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 227 (2001); Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting
Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (1996).
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highlight what Prosper Weil referred to as the relative normativity of
international norms."
The emergence of these normative and institutional challenges
to the sovereignty norm is evident in recent human rights litigation.
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged the universal prohibition against torture and the
potential civil liability of perpetrators in U.S. courts." In Regina v.
Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet, the
British House of Lords held that traditional principles of immunity
could not protect a former head of state from prosecution in the face
of torture claims.'3 In both cases, national tribunals held government
officials accountable for serious human rights abuses.
This Essay examines how human rights litigation has challenged
the sovereignty norm. Part II reviews the development of normative
and institutional challenges to the sovereignty norm. Part III then
considers how these normative and institutional challenges are
manifest in human rights litigation. Specifically, it examines the
development of Filartiga-style civil litigation and Pinochet-style
criminal litigation and their role in challenging the sovereignty norm.
A graduated normative hierarchy has now developed in
international law. While Prosper Weil expressed concern about the
development of relative normativity, recent history recognizes the
wisdom of a graduated normative hierarchy. 4 Sovereignty matters -
it maintains the stability of the international system and promotes
peaceful relations between states. But human rights also matter.
When the sovereignty norm is used to mask human rights abuses, its
rationale is undermined and it no longer merits a hallowed place in
11. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413 (1983).
12. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L. 1999) (Amnesty International and others
intervening).
14. For critiques of relative normativity, see generally Teraya Koji, Emerging
Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the Perspective of Non-
derogable Rights, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 917 (2001); Joseph Weiler & Andreas L. Paulus,
The Structure of Change in International Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in
International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 545 (1997); John Tasioulas, In Defence of
Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 85 (1996); Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in International
Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 305 (1993); Ronald St. J. Macdonald, Fundamental Norms in
Contemporary International Law, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 144 (1987); Theodor Meron,
On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1986).
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the hierarchy of international norms."
1. The Development of Relative Normativity
Since 1945, two developments have challenged the primacy of
the sovereignty norm. First, a diverse set of human rights norms has
developed. Some of these norms are non-derogable in nature and
liability attaches to anyone who violates them. Second, a diverse set
of institutions has emerged to apply these norms.
A. Normative Developments
It is not surprising that the sovereignty norm - respect for
territorial sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention - would
merit respect in a state-based international system. In the absence of
such arrangements, a state's ability to develop and maintain any
semblance of authority, whether foreign or domestic, is severely
curtailed.
This view of sovereignty is recognized throughout academic
scholarship. For example, the norm of Westphalian sovereignty has
long dominated the theory and practice of international law.16 This
should be expected, given that international law refers to the law
between states. "In simple terms, there would be no international
law without the nation-state and no nation-state would have
developed and prevailed but for the idea of sovereignty.', 18  The
prominence of Westphalian sovereignty is also found in other
15. See Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and
Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1999); Richard B. Lillich, A
United States Policy of Humanitarian Intervention and Intercession, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 278 (Donald P. Kommers & Gilburt D.
Loescher eds., 1979).
16. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1991); W.
Friedmann, The Growth of State Control Over the Individual and Its Effect Upon the
Rules of International State Responsibility, 19 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 118 (1938). But see
Christoph Schreur, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for
International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447 (1993); Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of
Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 397 (1991).
17. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 238-239 (3d ed.
1999). See also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 6 (J.H. Burns et al. eds., 1970).
18. Karima Bennoune, 'Sovereignty vs. Suffering?' Re-examining Sovereignty and
Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 243, 244 (2002)
(emphasis in original). See also Jan Klabbers, Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty:
Wimbledon Redux, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 345 (1998).
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disciplines, including political science.19 Prominent theories of
international relations emphasize the role of the state and the critical
function of sovereignty in the international system.' As noted by one
scholar, "[s]tates are the units whose interactions form the structure
of the international-political system. They will long remain so.""
Sovereignty is seen as an essential feature of this system because it
differentiates states from other actors in world affairs.'
The chronicle of human rights law, however, suggests that the
sovereignty norm is but one of several international norms.
Moreover, it is a norm that must give way in the face of higher norms.
One of the most powerful examples of this newly developing
normative hierarchy is evidenced in the establishment of individual
responsibility for serious human rights abuses and the concomitant
removal of immunity from government officials who commit such
acts.' For centuries, government officials, including heads of state,
diplomatic personnel, and other government functionaries, were not
subject to foreign prosecution even when they committed serious
human rights abuses. This protection was seen as a necessary
incident of sovereignty because one country could not judge the
actions of foreign government officials without presumably violating
the sovereign equality of another state.24 Over time, however, this
necessary incident of sovereignty has been curtailed. Individual
responsibility can now attach to government officials who commit
serious human rights abuses even when they commit such acts in their
own country.' In addition, immunity principles are no longer
19. See, e.g., HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS
(1994).
20. See, e.g., NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
(David Baldwin ed., 1993); NEOREALIsM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert 0. Keohane ed.,
1986); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983).
21. See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 95 (1979). See
also HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE 10 (5th ed. 1973).
22. WALTZ, supra note 21, at 95-96.
23. Immunity exists in several forms. It can apply to foreign governments and
instrumentalities, heads of state, diplomats, and other government officials.
24. See generally JURGEN BROHMER, STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1997); Michael P. Davis, Accountability and World Leadership:
Impugning Sovereign Immunity, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1357 (1999); Jerrold L.
Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights
of Kings, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 169 (1986).
25. Even foreign governments themselves can be held civilly liable for violating
international law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
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absolute - government officials are not subject to blanket immunity
from liability. A cursory review of the development of human rights
law since 1945 highlights these profound.developments.
One of the earliest efforts to establish individual responsibility
for human rights abuses, and to remove the immunity of government
officials for these acts, is found in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.26 The Charter established individual
criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.' It also removed immunity from
government officials who commit these crimes. Article 7 provided
that "[tihe official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State
or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment."'  In its opinion, the International Military Tribunal
determined that government officials can be held individually
responsible for serious human rights abuses and that they are not
immune from prosecution.
The principle of international law, which, under certain
circumstances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot be
applied to acts that are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their
official position in order to be freed from punishment in
appropriate proceedings.... He who violates the laws of war
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority
of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law.
In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
("Genocide Convention"). The Genocide Convention provides that
"genocide is a crime under international law, which [member states]
undertake to prevent and punish."'  Persons committing acts of
26. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
27. Id. art. 6.
28. Id. art. 7.
29. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
30. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"]. Article II
provides that "the following acts committed with [the] intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" shall constitute genocide:
(a) Killing members of the group;
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genocide are punishable, "whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials[,] or private individuals."3 This
provision is significant because it extends the Nuremberg principle of
individual criminal responsibility to a multilateral treaty, and it
applies prospectively to all government officials who commit acts of
genocide. 2
In 1984, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment ("Convention Against Torture"). The Convention
Against Torture establishes a comprehensive regime to prevent and
punish acts of torture.3 3 Member states must take effective measures
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under their jurisdiction. No
exceptional circumstances, including a threat of war or other public
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; [and]
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. art. II.
31. Id. art. IV. Article III provides that "[t]he following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement
to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide."
Id. art. III.
32. See, e.g., Catherine Cisse, The End of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda?
Prosecution of Genocide and War Crimes Before Rwandan Courts and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 161
(1998); Carla J. Ferstman, Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against
Humanity: The Example of Rwanda, 9 AFR. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 857 (1997).
33. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter "Convention
Against Torture"]. Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id. art. 1(1), at 113-14.
2002]
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emergency, may be used to justify torture.' While the Convention
Against Torture is silent on the question of individual responsibility
or the purported immunity of government officials, its provisions
have been interpreted to apply to any individual regardless of official
capacity.
The statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda ("ICTR") establish individual responsibility for serious
violations of international criminal law and remove any purported
immunity from individuals who commit such acts." Thus, "a person
who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of [an enumerated
crime] ... shall be individually responsible for the crime.
36
Moreover, "[t]he official position of any accused person, whether as
Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government
official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment."37  These provisions are most visible in the
recent proceedings against former Serbian leader Slobodan
Milosevic, who is accused of complicity in numerous atrocities
committed during the Yugoslav conflict.
More recently, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court ("Rome Statute") was adopted in July 1998 to establish a
permanent international tribunal to prosecute war crimes, genocide,
crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.39 Under the
Rome Statute, individual criminal responsibility attaches to anyone
who commits such crimes, or orders, solicits, induces or contributes to
the commission of such crimes." In addition, the Rome Statute
34. Id. art. 2(2), at 114.
35. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter "ICTY"]; Statute
for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter "ICTR"].
36. ICTY, supra note 35, art. 7(1); ICTR, supra note 35, art. 6(1).
37. ICTY, supra note 35, art. 7(2); ICTR, supra note 35, art. 6(2).
38. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL: A COMPANION (2002).
39. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter "Rome Statute"]. See generally LEILA NADYA
SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2002); COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Otto Triffterer ed.,
1999).
40. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 25.
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contains extensive restrictions on immunity. Article 27 provides that
official capacity is irrelevant for purposes of prosecution under the
Rome Statute:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity
as a Head of State or government, a member of a Government or
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for
reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
41jurisdiction over such a person.
In sum, international law recognizes that individual
responsibility now attaches to government officials even when they
commit serious human rights abuses in their own countries. In most
cases, immunity no longer protects them from liability. While the
recent decision of the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant
of 11 April 2000 placed some restrictions on prosecuting government
officials for serious human rights abuses, the ICJ indicated that its
ruling did not undermine the profound developments of the
international human rights movement.42 According to the ICJ,
individual responsibility and immunity from prosecution are two
different concepts, and immunity does not imply impunity. "While
jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal
responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional
immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain
offences; it cannot, however, exonerate the person to whom it applies
from all criminal responsibility.
' 43
41. Id. art. 27.
42. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. (Feb. 14) (forthcoming 2002), available at
http://vwv.icj-cij.orglicjwvvv/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2002). In its ruling, the ICJ held that a sitting foreign minister enjoys full immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution. Once he leaves office, however, he may be subject
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B. Institutional Developments
These normative developments would serve little purpose in the
absence of accompanying institutional developments. That is,
institutions are necessary to monitor and enforce the new normative
hierarchy. Initially, however, the institutional components lagged
behind their normative counterparts.
Note, for example, the different enforcement mechanisms
contained in the Genocide Convention and the Convention Against
Torture. The 1948 Genocide Convention provides two mechanisms
for enforcement: "a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of
which the act was committed, or by such an international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction."" And yet, no
international penal tribunal was established to prosecute genocide
until the establishment of the ICTY in 1993. In addition, the
Genocide Convention only authorizes national prosecution by one
country: the state in the territory where the act was committed.
In contrast, the 1984 Convention Against Torture provides a
more extensive enforcement regime. The Convention Against
Torture requires a member state to establish jurisdiction for acts of
torture in the following cases: (a) when the offences are committed in
any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft
registered in that state; (b) when the alleged offender is a national of
that state; (c) when the victim is a national of that state if that state
considers it appropriate; or (d) when the alleged offender is present
in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him.45
If a person alleged to have committed acts of torture is found in the
territory of a member state, the state is obligated to take that person
into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his presence.46 If
the state does not extradite that person, it must submit the case to its
competent authorities for prosecution.
The differences between the Genocide Convention and the
Convention Against Torture are significant. By requiring member
states to establish universal jurisdiction for acts of torture, the
Convention Against Torture establishes an extensive network of
prosecuting states. Only one state is authorized to prosecute acts of
genocide under the Genocide Convention. In contrast, the
44. Genocide Convention, supra note 30, art. VI, at 280-82.
45. Convention Against Torture, supra note 33, art. 5(1)-(2), at 114.
46. Id. art. 7(1), at 115.
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Convention Against Torture authorizes (and obligates) its 132
member states to prosecute acts of torture when perpetrators are
located in their territory. The implications of this distinction are
evident in the United States. For example, federal law authorizes
criminal prosecution for any act of torture regardless of where it was
committed as long as the perpetrator is found in the United States. 7
In contrast, criminal prosecution for an act of genocide is more
limited. Prosecution can only occur if the act of genocide was
committed in the United States or if the perpetrator is a U.S.
national."
This Essay does not suggest that normative and institutional
challenges to Westphalian sovereignty are new.49 For centuries,
"[r]ulers have intervened in the internal affairs of other states
through coercion and imposition and invited the insinuation of
external authority in their own polities through contracting and
conventions."5 Rather, this Essay suggests that the norms, rules, and
institutions used to challenge the sovereignty norm are new.
Government officials are now subject to civil and criminal liability for
serious human rights abuses. Liability can attach regardless of official
capacity." These developments represent a profound shift in
international law and practice. As noted in a recent federal district
court opinion:
The net results of these developments.., have caused some breach
in the theoretical walls that once absolutely impeded the exercise of
national jurisdiction against heads-of-state and other foreign
officials for private conduct that violates clear and unambiguous
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(A)(b) (2002).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2002).
49. Challenges to sovereignty have occurred throughout history. Even the
Treaties of Osnabriick and Mtinster, which signaled the Peace of Westphalia and the
purported birth of the modem international system, contained restrictions on
sovereignty. KRASNER, supra note 2, at 76-81. These agreements provided various
rights to religious minorities, protecting them from abuse and the vagaries of
monarchical rule. Efforts to protect minority groups continued throughout the 19th
and 20th Centuries.
50. Id. at 125.
51. See generally Hazel Fox, The Resolution of the Institute of International Law
of the Immunities of Heads of State and Government, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 119
(2002); Adam I. Hasson, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on
Trial: Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic - Trends in Political Accountability and
Transnational Criminal Law, 25 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 125 (2002).
2002]
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norms of established international law. As a consequence, it has
become harder for foreign officials accused of egregious personal
misdeeds contravening customary international standards to find
escape holes in which to crawl in flight from the arm of
international law and its associated implementing domestic
statutes.2
I. Challenging the Sovereignty Norm Through Human [ights
Litigation
Examples of these normative and institutional developments can
be seen in Filartiga-style civil litigation and Pinochet-style criminal
litigation. In both cases, human rights norms trumped the
sovereignty norm.
A. Filartiga-style Civil Litigation
The Filartiga case arose from the 1976 torture and murder of
Joelito Filirtiga in Asuncion, Paraguay. 3  A Paraguayan police
official, Americo Pefia-Irala, was accused of the crime, and yet no
action was taken against him in Paraguay. In March 1979,
Paraguayan activists notified the victim's sister Dolly Fildrtiga that
Pefia-Irala had left Paraguay and was living in New York. She
immediately brought a lawsuit in the federal district court for the
Eastern District of New York against Pefia-Irala, alleging wrongful
death and torture. The lawsuit was brought under the Alien Tort
Claims Act ("ATCA"), which provides that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action brought by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.,
54
The district court dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds,
holding that the term "law of nations," as employed in ATCA,
excludes the law that governs a state's treatment of its own citizens.
Because the lawsuit concerned the torture of a Paraguayan citizen by
a Paraguayan official in Paraguay, the district court concluded that
ATCA was not an appropriate basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's ruling to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
52. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
53. See generally Richard Pierre Claude, The Case of Joelito Filartiga and the
Clinic of Hope, 5 HuM. RTs. Q. 275 (1983).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002).
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In a groundbreaking decision, the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling and held that the lawsuit could proceed.55 After
reviewing numerous multilateral, regional, and national sources of
law, the Second Circuit determined that torture is firmly prohibited
by international law.
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the
world (in principle if not in practice), we find that an act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates
established norms of the international law of human rights, and
hence the law of nations."
According to the Second Circuit, this violation can occur regardless
of the nationality of the parties.
The Second Circuit also upheld the constitutionality of ATCA,
recognizing that U.S. courts "regularly adjudicate transitory tort
claims between individuals over whom they exercise personal
jurisdiction."57  In addition, Congress had specifically authorized
federal court jurisdiction over lawsuits alleging violations of
international law by adopting ATCA. Since the law of nations
formed a part of the common law of the United States, this grant of
jurisdiction was authorized by Article III of the U.S. Constitution.5'
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that "whenever an alleged
torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our
borders, [the Alien Tort Claims Act] provides federal jurisdiction." 9
The Second Circuit also concluded that establishing civil liability for
such acts "is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence."6
After the case was remanded, the district court found in favor of
the Fihirtiga family and awarded them $10 million in damages.61
Efforts to collect the judgment have been unsuccessful. For Dolly
Filirtiga, however, the lawsuit was not about money; it was about
55. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 880.
57. Id. at 885.
58. But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815
(1997).
59. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
60. Id. at 890.
61. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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justice.62
The Filartiga case established the viability of transnational law
litigation in the United States. Federal courts now recognize
jurisdiction under ATCA when three conditions are met: (1) an alien
sues; (2) for a tort; (3) that alleges a violation of international law. As
noted by the U.S. State Department, "[h]uman rights lawyers now
regularly invoke the Act in litigating international human rights
principles in United States courts."63
Since 1980, an increasing number of lawsuits have been filed by
victims of human rights abuses seeking civil remedies for injuries that
occurred outside the United States. These lawsuits have been
pursued by victims of human rights atrocities from countries such as
Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burma, Chile, China, Cuba, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Nigeria,
and the Philippines. They have alleged numerous violations of
international law, including arbitrary detention, forced
disappearance, torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity. Defendants have included foreign
governments, foreign government officials, private individuals, and
multinational corporations. Several of these lawsuits have resulted in
significant damage awards.'
B. Pinochet-style Criminal Litigation
In 1996, a Spanish magistrate began investigating the role of
General Augusto Pinochet in human rights abuses committed in
Chile between 1973 and 1990. When it was discovered that Pinochet
was visiting the United Kingdom, a Spanish magistrate requested that
English authorities arrest Pinochet. On October 16, 1998, the
Metropolitan Police served a provisional arrest warrant on Pinochet
in London. 5 The warrant alleged that Pinochet had participated in
the murder of Spanish citizens living in Chile between September 11,
1973 and December 31, 1983. A second provisional arrest warrant
was issued on October 22, 1998. The warrant alleged Pinochet's
62. See Taking Tyrants to Courts, AMERICAN LAWYER, Oct. 1991, at 56.
63. Initial Report by the U.S. Department of State to the U.N. Committee Against
Torture, para. 278, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (1999).
64. See generally THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY
(Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999); BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL
RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996).
65. See generally THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN
SPAIN AND BRITAIN (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000).
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participation in five offenses: (1) the infliction of severe pain and
suffering on another; (2) conspiracy to inflict severe pain or suffering
on another; (3) detention of hostages; (4) conspiracy to detain
hostages; and (5) conspiracy to commit murder.
Pinochet subsequently filed applications challenging his
detention. On October 28, 1998, the Divisional Court of the Queen's
Bench Division held both provisional arrest warrants invalid."
Specifically, the Divisional Court found that a former head of state
continues to enjoy immunity in respect to public acts performed while
he was head of state. Given the importance of the issues raised in the
Pinochet case, the Divisional Court immediately certified the case for
appeal to the House of Lords.
On November 25, 1998, the House of Lords issued its first
landmark ruling in the case.67 In a 3-2 decision, the Law Lords held
that Pinochet could not claim immunity from prosecution for alleged
acts of torture and hostage-taking. In a surprise development,
however, Pinochet's lawyers subsequently petitioned the Law Lords
to set aside their ruling based upon the recently discovered links
between Amnesty International, which had intervened in the case,
and Lord Hoffman, one of the Law Lords who ruled against
Pinochet.6' Pinochet's lawyers argued that Lord Hoffman's
participation in the proceedings gave rise to the appearance of bias.
On December 17, 1998, the House of Lords announced that its earlier
decision would be set aside.69 A new panel was subsequently
established to rehear the case.
On March 24, 1999, the House of Lords issued its second ruling
in the Pinochet case.70 In their 6-1 decision, the Law Lords found that
Pinochet could be extradited, but only for certain alleged crimes. The
Law Lords addressed two principal issues: the double criminality rule
and head of state immunity.
With respect to the double criminality rule, Lord Brown-
66. The Queen v. Evans, 38 I.L.M. 68 (1998).
67. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, 4 All E.R. 897
(H.L. 1998) (Amnesty International and others intervening).
68. It had been discovered that Lord Hoffman was Director and Chairperson of
Amnesty International Charity Limited. However, Lord Hoffman was not a member
of Amnesty International nor did he receive compensation for his work with the
organization.
69. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (No. 2), 1 All E.R.
577 (H.L. 1998).
70. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (No. 3), 2 All E.R.
97 (H.L. 1999) (Amnesty International intervening).
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Wilkinson found that Pinochet could only be extradited for crimes
that were recognized under the laws of both Spain and the United
Kingdom at the time of the alleged crimes.' There was no dispute
that acts of torture committed abroad were criminal under the laws of
Spain. In contrast, acts of torture committed abroad were not
punishable in the United Kingdom until September 29, 1988, the date
on which the United Kingdom incorporated the provisions of the
Convention Against Torture into English law ("Criminal Justice
Act"). Thus, Pinochet could only be extradited for acts of torture
committed after September 29, 1988.72 With respect to acts of
hostage-taking, Lord Brown-Wilkinson found that the Request for
Extradition did not allege crimes of hostage-taking as set forth in
English law ("Taking of Hostages Act"). Accordingly, the hostage-
taking charges did not constitute extradition crimes.'
With respect to head of state immunity, Lord Brown-Wilkinson
found that not all acts by a head of state constitute official acts of
state that merit immunity from prosecution. Accordingly, the critical
issue is to determine which acts constitute official functions of a head
of state. Lord Brown-Wilkinson suggested it would be inconsistent if
international law prohibited and criminalized certain acts and yet
recognized that such acts could be designated official functions
subject to immunity.
Can it be said that the commission of a crime which is an
international crime against humanity and jus cogens is an act done
in an official capacity on behalf of the state? I believe there to be
strong ground for saying that the implementation of torture as
defined by the Torture Convention cannot be a state function.74
If the Convention Against Torture did not waive the immunity of all
government officials, including heads of state, it would render useless
the entire structure of universal jurisdiction over torture. According
to Lord Brown-Wilkinson, all these factors demonstrate that
immunity for former heads of state is inconsistent with the provisions
of the Convention Against Torture. Thus, Pinochet could not claim
immunity for acts of torture committed after December 8, 1988, the
date when the United Kingdom ratified the Convention Against
71. Id. at 100-101.
72. Id. at 107.
73. Id. at 107.
74. Id. at 113.
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Torture.75
For these reasons, Lord Brown-Wilkinson found that extradition
proceedings could proceed with respect to those limited charges
alleging acts of torture and conspiracy to commit torture committed
after the United Kingdom incorporated the prohibition against
torture into U.K. law and after it ratified the Convention Against
Torture. The majority of the Law Lords shared Lord Brown-
Wilkinson's reasoning.
Despite this ruling, Pinochet was never extradited to Spain. On
March 2, 2000, British Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that
Pinochet would not be extradited due to humanitarian
considerations. Pinochet returned to Chile that same day.76 The
Pinochet precedent, however, was firmly established.'
In the absence of effective international institutions, most of the
enforcement of human rights norms has devolved to national
institutions. Indeed, national tribunals have now become a
prominent mechanism for challenging the sovereignty norm.' They
have done so in two ways. Through civil litigation, government
officials have been held civilly liable for human rights abuses.79
Through criminal prosecution, government officials have been held
criminally liable for human rights abuses." In both cases, individual
75. Id. at 115.
76. James Langman, Britain Frees Pinochet, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at Al;
Ray Moseley, Pinochet Returns Home, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3,2000, at 1.
77. See John Bosco, Dictators in the Dock, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 14, 2000, at 26;
Jonathan Curiel, Kissinger on Trial: Lawsuits are Designed to Expose His Bloody
Role in Chile's Coup, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2002, at D1; Anthony Faiola, Pinochet
Effect Spreading: Case Opens Way to Other Prosecutions, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,2000,
at Al.
78. See generally AIUSA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A SAFE HAVEN FOR
TORTURERS (2002); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PINOCHET PRECEDENT: How
VICTIMS CAN PURSUE HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMINALS ABROAD (2000); REDRESS,
CHALLENGING IMPUNITY FOR TORTURE: A MANUAL FOR BRINGING CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES FOR TORTURE COMMITTED ABROAD
(1999); INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES:
BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE ABROAD (1999).
79. See Hari Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity from Severe Human Rights
Violations: New Directions for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 35 (1998).
80. See Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 237 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, International Criminal Law and
Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829 (2000). But see Kerry Creque O'Neill, Note,
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responsibility attaches to government actors that commit human
rights abuses, and immunity no longer protects them from
prosecution.
IV. Conclusion
In 1982, Prosper Weil criticized the growing relative normativity
of international law. He expressed concern that a privileged
directorate of international society would create a normative
hierarchy, instilling its own values into the structure of international
law. Through this process, the interests of other states would be
disregarded. The purported equality of states would disappear,
thereby undermining "the inherent pluralism of international
society." In short, Weil feared that the essential features of
international law - voluntarism, positivism, and heterogeneity -
would be undermined by relative normativityf.
And yet, international society has managed to elude these perils
in its pursuit of justice for victims of human rights abuses. Both
Filartiga-style civil litigation and Pinochet-style criminal litigation
function within the contours of Weil's trinity. Voluntarism - the
norms that trump sovereignty have been accepted by the very states
they purport to bind. Positivism - these norms are codified by
treaty, create explicit obligations, and represent lex lata.
Heterogeneity - these norms and institutions maintain both
religious and ideological neutrality. As long as developments in
human rights law continue to perpetuate these essential features of
international law, the wisdom of a graduated normative hierarchy will
be affirmed.
A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity?: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 289 (2002).
81. Weil, supra note 11, at 441.
82. Id. at 420-421.
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